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Since the passing of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, the 
past 20 years represent one of the most remarkable eras for performance budgeting initiatives in 
the United States. As a result, many studies about this tool have also been conducted and 
published. Based on a systematic review of articles on performance budgeting-related research in 
major journals in the ten years between 2002 and 2011, this study assesses how performance 
budgeting research has evolved over time, reviews its accomplishments, and suggests a few 
directions for future studies, such as the need to control for different intervening factors to 
establish causality, the need for more coherent theoretical frameworks to guide empirical work 
and structure the relationship between causal factors, and the need for methodological diversity. 
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Taking Stock:  Assessing and Improving Performance Budgeting Theory and Practice 
 
Introduction 
2013 was the 20th year since the passing of the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) of 1993. These 20 years represent one of the most remarkable eras for performance 
initiatives in the United States.  From performance reporting exercises under the GPRA 
framework, to the Performance Assessment Rating Tool proposed by the Bush administration, to 
the Obama administration’s focus on performance evidence-based decision-making, the U.S. 
federal government has continued to experiment with different tools and mechanisms to integrate 
performance measurement and reporting with budgeting. At the same time, 32 (80%) of the 40 
states that have passed performance budgeting-related legislation have done so within the past 20 
years (Lu & Willoughby, 2012).  Many local governments have also introduced different 
performance budgeting systems (Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; Poister & Streib, 1999). 
Although these reforms have enjoyed varying degrees of success, performance budgeting 
movement is pervasive.  
As a result of this boom in performance budgeting practices in the U.S., many academic 
studies about this tool have also been conducted and published during the past ten years.  From 
descriptive analyses of different practices and mechanisms, to evaluative studies about the 
impact of reforms, to normative and critical studies about the values and pitfalls of different 
models, scholars have contributed significantly to the volume of academic studies in this area. 
The use of performance information, however, is still deemed both half-empty and half-full 
(Kamensky, 2012).  Is this because we have hit “the limits of any formal government-wide 
performance requirements” (Moynihan & Lavertu, 2012, p. 601)?  Or is it because we have not 
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found the proper approach(es), if any, to incorporate performance information in decision 
making, especially in a context as political as budgeting?   
  Based on a systematic review of articles on performance budgeting in 14 major journals 
in the ten years between 2002 and 2011, this study attempts to assess how performance 
budgeting research has evolved over time.  Public policy and public administration has a history 
of conducting systematic reviews of important literature to make the knowledge more relevant to 
researchers as well as to practitioners who must use the research (O’Toole, 1986; Lindblom, 
1979). In this paper, we try to address these questions: What are the impacts of performance 
budgeting? What factors influence the success of performance budgeting? What research 
methodologies are commonly used? Finally, what are the key theoretical models and foundations 
of the past studies?  
Assessing the past is important for setting the stage for the future. In particular, given the 
new context of governance in the 21st century, such as rising fiscal stress faced by many 
governments, concerns over long-term liabilities and social inequity, are there new research 
questions that future performance budgeting research should focus on in the coming years? What 
new methodologies should future researchers consider?  What other theoretical frameworks 
should future studies explore more?   Using these questions as our framework of analysis, this 
study takes stock of what we know, and then provides a roadmap for future studies  to help 
advance the practice and understanding of performance budgeting.   
 
Assessment Methodology 
While there is no universally accepted definition of performance budgeting, the term is 
generally used to refer to the practice of integrating performance measurement information into 
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the budgetary process so that managers can manage public resources more effectively and 
efficiently and policymakers can use the information to hold agencies accountable for results.  
There are many possible systems and models in this integration process.  Based on performance 
budgeting practices among developed economies, the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) categorizes performance budgeting into three types: presentational 
performance budgeting, which simply puts performance information into budget documents; 
performance-informed budgeting, which uses performance information in the budget deliberative 
process but does not give the information any predefined weight in the decisions; and direct 
performance budgeting, which allocates resources based on results achieved (Curristine, 2005; 
OECD, 2007).   
Because of these diverse practices and the lack of consensus among scholars on the 
formal definition of performance budgeting, we do not exclude any practices or models of 
“performance budgeting” when we review past research findings.  Instead, we accept the 
judgment of the authors when they define the practice as “performance budgeting” or when they 
describe the practice as a formal way to integrate performance information into the budgetary 
process. Because of resource constraints and our desire to have a systematic and consistent 
methodology in selecting review subjects, we do not include any books or working papers. The 
scope of our review is therefore limited to 12 Social Science Citation-Indexed (SSCI) journals 
and two prominent but non-SSCI journals in the field of public budgeting and finance1.  We first 
used keyword searches of the titles and abstracts of journal articles using these terms, 
“performance*” (wildcard) and “budget*” (wildcard), together.  We also used the terms “pbb” 
and “performance assessment rating” to catch potentially related articles. The authors then read 
through the abstracts, and if necessary, the content, of the articles to determine if the articles 
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focused on the practice and impact of performance budgeting, or practices of budgeting that had 
to do with performance issues.   Studies that were about general budgeting but not related to 
performance issues were excluded.  Likewise, studies that were about performance but not linked 
to the budgetary process, budgetary documentation, or budgetary outcomes were excluded.  We 
also did not include book reviews and symposia introductions.   Based on these criteria, we 
obtained 61 articles related to performance budgeting that were published between 2002 and 
2011 in the selected journals.      
The articles were then coded systematically for information relating to research questions, 
methodology, theoretical frameworks, and primary findings. As others have noted, any attempt 
to comprehensively examine any burgeoning field of study is necessarily limited most 
importantly by the researcher’s awareness of contributions (O’Toole, 1986).  We believe that our 
systematic review captures a good portion of the literature on this topic but important omissions 
are inevitable.  For example, we do not conduct any review of non-English language materials, 
even though these studies have expanded significantly for the past decade and offer many 
interesting insights about the implementation and challenges of performance budgeting reforms 
in different governance and cultural settings.   
 
The State of the Field 
There are many ways to summarize the state of the field. We start the discussion by 
presenting the findings on the two most commonly studied aspects of performance budgeting: 
the impact of the tool and the factors that influence its success. Then we review the 
methodologies and theoretical frameworks used in these studies and some of the long lasting 
issues identified by the literature as seemingly inevitable challenges to performance budgeting.  
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The Impact of Performance Budgeting  
Typically, a budget process is divided into four stages: executive budget preparation, 
legislative appropriation, budget execution and program management, and audit.  If performance 
measurement is integrated into budgeting, a natural question is how the tool impacts these four 
stages of budgeting.  
 
[Table 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Out of the 61 studies reviewed, 27 (44 percent) evaluate the impact of performance 
budgeting on the executive budget preparation, 31 (51%) on the legislative appropriation process, 
26 (43%) on budget execution and program management, and only 2 (3%) on auditing.   Given 
the legislature’s power of the purse, many researchers’ interests focus understandably on the 
legislative phase. However, there has been a growing interest in how performance information is 
used in other phases of budgeting in recent years, even though this focus has fluctuated over time 
(see Table 1).  In the mid-2000s, more attention was paid to the impact of performance budgeting 
in the executive preparatory stage.  Between 2002 and 2007, when the Bush administration 
began to implement the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), there was growing interest in 
the role of performance budgeting in budget execution, but interest began to wane in the late 
2000s.   
Among the 27 studies that examine the impact of performance budgeting on the 
executive budget preparation process, 81 percent find some impact of performance budgeting, 
and these impacts are wide-ranging, from changing the presentation of budgetary information, 
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modifying the budgetary structure and process, and changing the amount of budget requests, to 
enhancing the communication among departments and between the executive and legislative 
branches of the government (Willoughby and Melkers, 2000; U.S. GAO, 2003). For example, at 
the U.S. federal level, performance information is now fully integrated into agencies’ strategic 
planning and budgetary preparation process (Breul, 2007; Ho, 2007), and performance 
information seems to have strengthened the focus on program management and results by the 
budget office and agencies (Posner & Fantone, 2007).  At the state level, Grizzle and Pettijohn 
(2002) show that the Florida performance budgeting reform led to new operating and reporting 
guidelines from the Governor’s Office and the Office of Planning and Budgeting.  It also 
impacted executive communication with the Office of Program Policy Analysis and 
Governmental Accountability.  Jordan and Hackbart (2005) show that the majority of their state 
budget survey respondents agreed that performance budgeting was successful or somewhat 
successful in changing the budget process, and Lu (2011) shows that budget office and agencies 
were more likely to use performance information if performance budgeting reforms centered 
more on agencies’ needs. At the local level, performance budgeting is more likely to show a 
significant impact in large cities since these cities are more likely to have incorporated 
performance measurement into the budgetary process (Ho & Ni, 2005).  For smaller jurisdictions, 
such as cities with populations fewer than 50,000, performance measurement may not be 
required and performance information may be rarely used in the budgetary process (Rivenbark & 
Kelly, 2006).           
While performance budgeting has clearly shown some impact on the structure, process 
and communication of the executive budget preparation process, only 42 percent of those studies 
that focus on the impact of performance budgeting on the legislative appropriation process show 
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that the tool has an impact on the legislature.  About one quarter of the studies show that 
performance budgeting impacts the structure and communication of the legislative process, only 
19 percent show that performance budgeting impacts the power distribution of the process, and 
only two out of 31 studies (6 percent) show that performance budgeting has some impact on the 
legislative culture.     
Compared with the impact on the legislative stage, the impact of performance budgeting 
is considerably stronger in the budget execution stage.  About 65 percent of the 26 studies that 
examine the budget execution stage find evidence of some impact.  For example, Willoughby 
(2004) shows that the majority of state budgeters perceive performance budgeting as an effective 
or somewhat effective tool to improve program management and agency communication 
internally and externally.  At the local level, a survey study by Melkers and Willoughby (2005) 
and a case study by Ho (2011) show similar findings about the communication and program 
management effects of performance information.  However, for the majority of the rest of the 
studies, the exact impacts of performance budgeting are not specified clearly.  Only less than 
one-third of the studies find some impact on the budget execution process and structure, such as 
changing the program structure or operational process, and only 23 percent of the studies suggest 
that the tool impacts the resource allocation or the communication process. Also, only a few 
studies (15%) find that performance budgeting changes the political structure and power 
distribution.  For example, Dull (2006) and Ho (2007) show that performance budgeting can shift 
more power to the budget office and strengthen the chief executive’s political control over 
agencies.  Hence, even though the majority of the studies have found some impacts on budget 
execution, future studies should explore more specifically what those impacts are.  
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Finally, the audit stage of budgeting may be related to performance.  However, only two 
of the 61 journal articles examined in this study have any discussion about the effects of 
performance budgeting on the audit stage (Lu 2011; Melkers &Willoughby, 2005), and only one 
of them finds some impact on the audit stage by showing that performance information may be 
used to target audits (Melkers &Willoughby, 2005).  The very thin findings here should not be 
used to infer that performance information is not important to auditing.  What we have found 
here may only indicate that performance auditing is often viewed by public administration 
scholars as a separate field and that studies focusing on performance audit or how performance 
information is used in auditing are likely to fall outside of the sampling frame of this study.   
In summary, these findings seem to reiterate a story that many past studies have asserted -
- performance budgeting is more likely to be an executive tool, rather than a legislative 
appropriation tool.   Moreover, performance budgeting may strengthen program management 
and impact the structure and process of budgeting, such as strengthening the ties between 
strategic planning, goal setting, and public reporting.  The focus on results in executive 
budgeting may also improve inter-agency and executive-legislative communication.  Hence, it is 
not just about influencing the budget allocation.  In fact, only about 20 percent of the studies that 
analyzed the impact of performance budgeting in different stages of budgeting showed any 
significant impact on the monetary allocation amount. The few studies that show some budgetary 
impact tend to concentrate at the state level (Burns & Lee, 2004; Willoughby, 2004; Reddick, 
2007; Klase & Dougherty, 2008).  Hence, the existing literature is quite pessimistic about using 
performance information to influence the amount of budget requests or legislative appropriations.  
Long-time observers of performance budgeting even advise against any mechanistic link 
between performance results and budgetary allocation (Joyce, 2003; Posner & Fantone, 2007).    
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The Factors Influencing the Success of Performance Budgeting 
In addition to performance budgeting impacts, another important and growing line of 
research focuses on the factors influencing how performance information can be integrated into 
budgeting successfully.  One cautionary note before we present the findings is that due to the 
frequent use of descriptive methods in the literature, the factors identified by the literature do not 
necessarily validate causality. In most of the studies examined, no control variables were applied.  
With this caveat, we find that there are a total of 27 kinds of factors. Table 3 presents the 
factors’ frequency and percentage identified as important. Overall, the top three factors that are 
important for the use of performance in budgeting are: “Quality of Measurement” (mentioned by 
61 percent of the articles), such as how to define program outcomes, collect measurement data, 
and select the appropriate performance measures, “Political Support” (51%) and “Executive 
Leadership Support” (33%).   
Clearly, with 27 factors identified, the literature review suggests that the field is not short 
of providing factors that influence the use of performance information in budgeting. However, 
the coverage of these variables varies considerably (see Table 3).  To generalize the results and 
provide a more holistic understanding of the key patterns of the findings, we group these factors 
into six categories: measurement system, support for performance, investment and capacity, 
implementation approaches, (dis)incentives, and characteristics of implementation organizations.  
In this process, we rely primarily on the frameworks suggested in the study by the National 
Performance Management Advisory Commission (NPMAC, 2010), Lu et al. (2009) and Yang 
and Hsieh (2007). The general understanding from these studies is that 1) performance budgeting 
tasks are sequential, from measurement and reporting to management and improving, and these 
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activities need to be integrated with the traditional budget processes (Measurement System, 
Implementation Approaches and (Dis)Incentives); 2) realignment of resources and capacities for 
performance is important (Investment And Capacity); 3) support from a diverse body of 
stakeholders is critical (Support For Performance), and 4) performance budgeting is susceptible 
to the environment in which it operates (Characteristics Of Implementing Organizations).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 Among the group of factors, the category that gets the greatest attention among 
researchers is “Measurement System”, which is an important precursor to performance budgeting.  
It is not surprising that measurement issues are ranked first because they embody both technical 
and political aspects of performance budgeting.  As Posner and Fantone (2007, p. 365) explain, 
“far from removing politics from budgeting, the linkage of performance to budgeting raises the 
stakes associated with performance goals and measures. As such, the performance analysis 
marshaled to support budget decisions is potentially more vulnerable to political debate and 
conflict.” This high frequency of measurement issues affirms Joyce’s call that “a concern for 
measuring government performance should simply be a concern for measuring it correctly” 
(Joyce, 1993, p. 3). It also indicates that measurement problems have remained a challenge 
despite decades of performance budgeting initiatives at the federal, state, and local levels.  
Specifically, the literature identifies four major concerns in any measurement system --- the 
quality of measurement, timeliness of the data, linkage with strategic plans, and linkage with 
resource allocation. The general understanding is that measurement quality is a necessity; timely 
data makes performance relevant for decisions; linkage with strategic plans (both with agency 
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level plans and with government-wide plans) improves the “vertical” integration of performance 
with planning, where each performance indicator contributes to a larger plan for the future; and 
the linkage with resource allocation signals that performance matters. The overwhelming finding 
is that good performance measurement improves the implementation of performance budgeting. 
However, a few questions remain unanswered.  For example, how may researchers know that a 
measurement system is of high quality?  Besides perception surveys, are there other 
methodologies and standards researchers may use to evaluate a measurement system?  Also, the 
prior literature has suggested categorizing the quality of measurement into four dimensions: 
measurement validity and reliability, measure usefulness in decision making, administrative 
feasibility, and political acceptance of measures (Lu, 2008), but this line of research is rather thin.  
Further study is needed to assess the quality of measurement in performance budgeting systems.  
“Support for Performance” is the second most analyzed group of factors among the 
articles reviewed.  As expected, political support is the most important issue (for example, see 
Hou, Lunsford, Sides, & Jones, 2011).  Since budgeting is political, the politics of performance 
budgeting has been vividly depicted and appreciated by the literature (ranked 2nd out of 27 
factors).  For instance, Moynihan (2006) argues that performance information is not used in a 
simplistic way.  As he further points out, ambiguity is inherent in organizational life, and so the 
potential for rival interpretations of performance information as well as policy advocacy 
influences the use of performance information in budgeting.  According to Moynihan, the extent 
to which performance information contributes to budgeting depends on “the persuasiveness of 
the arguments made and the intensity of the interest and preferences of the actors involved” 
(Moynihan, 2006, p. 159).  This review of the past studies shows clearly that the use of 
performance information is often deemed a political choice where political support both enables 
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and limits its very survival as a tool.  In addition, the importance of executive leadership squares 
well with the general knowledge in the field.  For example, Behn (2002) mentions that energetic 
leadership for performance distinguishes ‘‘an active strategy’’ (p. 19) from a passive 
performance system because leadership support nurtures behavioral changes.  Furthermore, the 
importance of legislative support is gaining attention (Bourdeaux, 2006; Bourdeaux, 2008; 
Posner & Fantone, 2007).  In particular, Bourdeaux (2008)’s research goes beyond the 
mentioning of the importance of legislature and examines how performance can be integrated 
with legislative budget process through policy networks maintained by key committee staff.    
Also under the cohort of “support for performance,” the review shows that management 
support matters for performance budgeting.  “Management” here means the willingness and 
capacity of management to budget or manage for performance. The roles of management are 
broadly defined and reflected in various ways in the literature, such as “managerial flexibility” 
(Breul, 2007), “managerial accountability for performance” (Newcomer, 2007), or the Obama 
administration’s “performance agenda,” which embraces an agency-centered approach (Joyce, 
2011).  Managerial support, a critical component within the factor group, “support for 
performance,” is particularly important for agencies’ use of performance information in 
budgetary decisions.  Lu (2007) finds that the impact of management support is about three times 
the impact of measurement quality on the use of performance information by agencies.  
Moynihan & Lavertu (2012) also emphasize the importance of managerial involvement.  The 
general consensus is that, as Lu (2007, p.13) puts it, “for agencies to use measures for budgetary 
purposes, whether agencies are managed based on performance is critically important.”  Also, 
the importance of management support is often put within the context that the management lacks 
capacity or flexibility to act based on performance information.  For example, Newcomer (2007, 
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p. 348) notes that “the gap between managerial accountability for performance and authority to 
shape performance remains to be addressed in many places in the U.S. federal system."  
Compared with the significance of political, legislative, executive, and managerial 
support, the factor of “staff buy-in” is not frequently cited (only 8%).  This finding is somewhat 
surprising and seems to confirm that performance budgeting is still deemed more as a top-down 
reform. In addition, although citizen support has caught increasing attention in the recent 
literature (such as Bourdeaux, 2008; Ho & Coates, 2004; Kasymova & Schachter, 2014; Kim & 
Schachter, 2013), the role of citizens in general is rather understudied (13%).  Bourdeaux makes 
a case for strengthening the study of citizens. Recognizing that engaging legislators in 
performance budgeting is rather difficult, she suggests that “raising the prominence of 
performance measures through increased efforts at constituent engagement or outreach” (2008, p. 
564) holds the potential to significantly change the incentives that legislators face in their 
decision making process.    
An important advancement in the recent literature is the importance of performance 
culture and shared responsibilities in performance budgeting.  There is no doubt that individual 
stakeholders’ participation is important.  The concept of “shared responsibility,” however, goes 
beyond shared participation in and commitment to performance budgeting (Breul, 2007; Jordan 
& Hackbart, 2005; Lu, Willoughby, & Arnett, 2009; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005).  Instead, 
performance budgeting calls for systemic effort, and needs to anticipate the participation of one 
actor influencing another.  For instance, the active role of agencies in performance budgeting 
may limit the interest of legislators because “executive staff and agencies are not an especially 
trusted source of information for legislators” to make budgetary decisions (Bourdeaux, 2008, p. 
547).  After studying participation patterns among actors, Lu (2011, p. 98) concludes that 
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“agencies need to play an active yet not dominant role in performance measurement to achieve 
better outcome in the performance integration.”  In short, more participation by one actor does 
not necessarily mean better outcomes for the performance system as a whole, and the 
responsibilities need to be shared by important budgetary actors to sustain performance 
budgeting in a meaningful way.  Overall, although the responsibility for supporting performance 
is increasingly expected to be shared as a manifestation of performance culture, executive 
leadership support within the chain of command is the most-cited factor among the articles 
analyzed.     
The surveyed literature also confirms that performance budgeting requires various 
elements identified in the cohort of investment and capacity: time, resources, staff capacity and 
information system capacity.  Specifically, 25 percent of the articles identify resources, 21 
percent identify staff capacity, 21 percent identify information system capacity, and 8 percent 
identify time investment as important.  In addition, the variables in the cohort of (dis)incentives 
for performance budgeting have not yet been well-studied.  This, in part, is due to the rare 
occurrence of the actual use of incentives in budgeting for performance.  We observe that the 
study of formal performance budgeting requirement (i.e. legislation or executive orders), while 
not yet frequent in the articles surveyed here, is on the rise.  Seventy percent of the articles that 
mention the importance of legal authority or foundation in performance budgeting appear in the 
last four years of our study period (2007-2011).  Clearly, one factor contributing to increased 
awareness of the legal foundation in the literature derives from the heightened effort to formalize 
and institutionalize performance budgeting in the past several decades following GPRA, 
especially in the 1990s.  For instance, at the federal level, Breul (2007) calls GPRA “a 
foundation for performance budgeting.”  At the state level, Lu and Willoughby (2012) find that 
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40 states have performance-informed budgeting laws, and Lu, Willoughby, and Arnett (2009) 
believe that “legislating results” signals the legislative intent and structures the implementation 
of performance budgeting.  On the other hand, the literature cautions that legal requirements may 
induce the production of performance information but not the use of performance information 
(Moynihan & Lavertu, 2012).  Although the subject has not yet been the focus of extensive study, 
most of the writings on the legal requirements of performance budgeting so far have found that  
the legal foundation is not only symbolic but also instrumental in implementing performance 
budgeting.  Specifically, the literature indicates that the positive impact of performance laws on 
performance budgeting implementation is manifested at a minimum of two levels: the presence 
of the law and the content of law.  Its presence signals the legislative intent in strengthening 
performance budgeting, providing legal authority (Andrews, 2004), and sustaining performance-
oriented practices through the transitions of executive leadership change (Chi, 2008).  At the 
same time, a careful craft of the content of laws helps set the system view of performance 
budgeting and guide the implementation process (Lu et al., 2009; Lu, 2011).  The literature 
indicates that state leaders in performance budgeting tend to have more comprehensive laws that 
specify measurement linkages to strategic plans, measurement reporting requirements, 
measurement design, the process of results evaluation, and shared responsibility among various 
stakeholders more than their counterparts do (Lu et al., 2009; Lu, 2011).     
What factors are less likely to be identified as important to the success of performance 
budgeting?  This literature review seems to point out two groups of factors, “Characteristics of 
Implementing Organizations” and “Implementation Approaches.”  The emergence of these 
factors as less important in the literature suggests two competing hypotheses.  First, these factors 
are indeed not that important.  Second, these factors are important, but the literature has not yet 
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paid enough attention to these contextual factors and how they may constrain or influence the 
design and implementation of performance budgeting.  In the midst of the politics of 
performance budgeting, whether or not implementation strategies make a difference is yet to be 
fully tested.  In some cases, strategies are blended, and it is hard to trace the causality of impacts. 
As the title of one article notes, performance activities sometimes represent “[t]op-down 
direction for bottom-up implementation” (Long and Franklin, 2004, p. 309).  
Another possible explanation for why some variables are less likely to be identified as 
important is that there are so many additional contextual factors and as a result, any “one size fits 
all” strategy is impossible.  For example, the contextual factors commonly studied include 
economic factors (such as economic downturn), organizational factors (such as employee size) 
and demographic variables (such as population). The studies that have looked at these contextual 
factors have not come to any consensus.   One of these studies notes, “one of the major 
difficulties in performance budgeting is in distinguishing between program impacts based on 
physical or socio-economic environmental conditions, and those based on management decisions” 
(Kasdin, 2010).  Furthermore, most studies do not have sufficient macro-contextual data and 
micro-organizational or individual employee data over time and across different types of 
programs or organizations to study the roles of the contextual factors appropriately.  Hence, 
additional studies at the agency level or at the program level, such as those by Gilmour and 
Lewis (2005; 2006) and Ho (2011), are needed in the field.   
Overall, the literature has identified many factors influencing performance budgeting, but 
more efforts are still needed to structure the factors into some holistic frameworks.  There is a 
consensus that measurement, support for performance, capacity and training, and the presence 
and content of performance laws contribute positively to the success of performance budgeting, 
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but there is little consensus on whether the characteristics of the implementing organization and 
implementation approach matter. 
 
Review of Research Methodology  
This study also examines what methodologies are used to analyze the practice and 
impacts of performance budgeting and how these methods evolve over time.   We coded articles 
based on five common methods: case study and interviews, surveys, content analysis, descriptive 
statistics, and multivariate statistics.  A given article may include more than one method.  For 
example, a case study based on interviews or surveys may also contain descriptive and 
multivariate statistical analysis.  In this case, all three methods would be coded for the article.  
Based on this coding scheme, we found that fourteen out of 61 articles reviewed do not have any 
formal research method and focus on a general or theoretical discussion of performance 
budgeting.     
Among all the articles, the most frequently used method is descriptive statistics, which 
are found in 27 articles (44.3%) (see Table 4).  Case studies and interviews, the next most 
frequently used method, are found in 22 articles (36.1%).  Sixteen articles (26.2%) use surveys 
and fourteen articles (23.0%) use multivariate statistics.  Content analysis is employed only four 
times (6.6%).   The pattern of methodology usage does not show any clear trend over time, 
except that descriptive statistical analysis has been used relatively more consistently since 2004, 
both in the analysis of state performance budgeting reforms (Burns & Lee, 2004; Jordan & 
Hackbart, 2005; Lu et al., 2009; Willoughby, 2004) and in the analysis of federal initiatives (Dull, 
2006; Long & Franklin, 2004; Mullen, 2006).  The utilization of other methods has fluctuated 
more obviously.  For example, the use of surveys was at its peak in 2006 but has declined since 
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then.  Content analysis has been used sporadically, with only four articles over the study period 
(Franklin, 2002; Frisco & Stalebrink, 2008; Ho & Ni, 2005; Lee & Wang, 2009) .  Given the fact 
that both surveys and content analysis require an extensive time and labor investment, it is 
understandable that they have not been used regularly. 
[Table 4 about here] 
In more recent years, there have been more studies using multivariate statistical analyses.  
In addition to multivariate regression (Franklin, 2002; Ho & Ni, 2005; Melkers & Willoughby, 
2005), other empirical methodologies, such as cluster analysis, time series regression, and 
structural equation modeling have also been used (Handley & Howell-Moroney, 2010; Lee & 
Wang, 2009; Lu, 2011) .  However, statistical modeling is still not a dominant methodology.  
One of the barriers to statistical analysis is the availability of data.  Even though over time, 
departmental and program budget performance information has become more transparent and 
publicly available, how performance information is actually used and how the usage differs by 
agencies, program nature, and leadership structure are still a puzzle.  To answer these questions, 
researchers often need to rely on in-depth interviews, field observations, and documentary 
research (Courty & Marschke, 2003; Gueorguieva et al., 2009; Ho, 2011; Kasdin, 2010; Martin 
& Singh, 2004).  Hence, until there is a more systematic release of program performance and 
budget data and the process characteristics of the budgetary decision-making process, attempts to 
conduct any large scale quantitative analysis of performance budgeting practice and impact will 
remain a challenge, and the field still needs well-designed qualitative studies to provide in-depth 
insights on how performance information is used in the budgetary process.  
 
Theoretical Frameworks Used 
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We also review the theoretical foundations of the past studies.  To our surprise, among 
the 61 studies examined, most (45) do not contain any theoretical framework.  They are 
descriptive in nature, trying to help readers understand how performance budgeting was 
implemented by a particular government during a certain era. This descriptive focus is perfectly 
acceptable, especially when new performance reform initiatives are introduced and researchers 
and readers are trying to find out what really happens before theorizing the causal relationships 
or implementation hurdles faced by the reforms.  However, as the field continues to mature, a 
more theoretical focus will be necessary. 
Among the 16 studies that have incorporated some theoretical discussion or perspectives, 
we find no clear dominant paradigm that guides the work on performance budgeting. Some 
studies look at performance budgeting as a budget phenomenon and provide some theoretical 
discussion of the tool in the context of budget incrementalism and rationalism (Kelly & 
Rivenbark, 2008; Pitsvada, & LoStracco, 2002; Reddick, 2007).  Others look at performance 
budgeting more from an organizational management perspective and examine how the structure 
and process, organizational nature, and managerial capacity influence the implementation and 
success of reforms (Gueorguieva et al., 2009; Moynihan, 2006; Sterck, 2007).   There are also 
some who treat performance budgeting as a policy phenomenon and apply implementation 
theories and other policy evaluative frameworks to evaluate different performance budgeting 
initiatives (Greitens & Joaquin, 2010; Grizzle & Pettijohn, 2002; Long & Franklin, 2004).    
 Hence, there is no clear dominant theory of performance budgeting, and the field is still 
wide open for a more in-depth theoretical examination of the phenomenon. An earlier critique by 
Yang and Hsieh (2007) about performance measurement studies seems to be equally applicable 
in the field of performance budgeting: “the literature on government performance measurement 
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is largely descriptive and prescriptive, with limited attention to theory building and hypothesis 
testing” (2007, p. 861).   Hence, a stronger focus on the theoretical anchors of performance 
budgeting will be helpful to advance its future practice and research. 
 
The Limits of Performance Budgeting?  
Finally, any review of the use of performance information as a tool for budgeting would 
not be complete without discussing its limits and some of the seemingly perpetual concerns. To 
us, this issue is important because these limits bring to light some of the tricky research topics in 
the field that are currently understudied.  For instance, V.O. Key (1940) raises a fundamental 
question of budgeting, “On what basis should we budget?”  This is linked directly to the 
fundamental premise of performance budgeting.  Should performance information and results be 
a legitimate basis on which a government should budget?  The field seems to suggest compelling 
arguments for both “yes” and “no”.   One of the most compelling challenges to the performance 
movement pertains to the issue of democratic values (Radin, 2006).  To many scholars, values 
such as democracy and public demands should take precedence over program efficiency and 
effectiveness in budgeting consideration (Shah & Shen, 2007).  At the same time, other scholars 
in the field argue for the important role of performance information in budgeting, especially as a 
way to inform decisions.  What complicates the question further is the politics surrounding 
budgeting.  Performance information may get noticed because it fits well with the political 
agenda of politicians at one moment, but may get ignored because it contradicts with their 
agenda later.  As Posner and Fantone  (2007, p. 365) delicately put it:  
“although too little attention is commonly viewed as undermining previous performance 
budgeting initiatives, the linkage of performance metrics with the budget and policy 
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agendas of particular political actors carries its own risks and challenges as well. 
Although these risks may, in fact, be an inevitable consequence of a heightened attention 
to performance information, a risk exists that this could undermine the compelling appeal 
that performance frameworks and information have for decision makers—namely, their 
perceived legitimacy as an expert-based approach to capture the consequences of 
decisions for results.”  
Indeed, as one reviewer of this research points out, “performance faces risks both in 
being irrelevant for budget and policy debates and in being too relevant.”  While the risk of being 
irrelevant has been known for a long time, the risk of being too relevant also seems to fly in the 
face of performance legitimacy, because this risk subjects the integrity of performance budgeting 
to political maneuvering and gaming.  Recent cases in the U.S., such as school superintendents' 
cheating under the accountability framework established by the No Child Left Behind legislation, 
or the New York City Police Department’s controversial practices of stop and frisk under the 
tight grip of the COMPSTAT performance system, are some examples showing that performance 
information can be misused if it becomes “too relevant” in the policymaking and resource 
allocation process.  As the reviewer vividly describes, no one will willingly load a gun that is 
pointed at their head.  As such, the question about the legitimate usage of performance 
information in budgeting still begs more careful consideration.  Future research may analyze 
further under what political and organizational conditions performance information can be used 
legitimately and relevantly in budgeting without compromising its integrity.   
A related challenge to performance budgeting at the operational level is what managers 
and budgeters should do with performance information, assuming good political support and 
excellent performance information quality.  More specifically, a repeated question either clearly 
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stated or implied in performance budgeting is whether the government should cut a program’s 
budget in light of high program performance, assuming they can do better with less, or increase 
its budget in light of low performance, assuming that more resource availability may improve 
performance.   Prior studies as well as the practice in this field do not have a definite answer to 
this question.  The intractability of operational consistency also puts a limit on the extent to 
which there is any direct relationship between performance and budgeting.  Clearly, the 
relationship cannot be linear and mechanical.  Then, what kind of relationship should it be? The 
dialogue theory suggested by Moynihan (2006) seems to confirm that the relationship is ad hoc 
and ambiguous.  At best it could be described as “it depends”.  That probably explains the subtle 
change in the literature from “performance-based budgeting” to “performance-informed 
budgeting.”  However, the literature has not done enough to attempt to delineate the ad hoc 
relationship.  Future research may explore further questions such as “on what it depends,” “how 
it works,” or “under what circumstances a positive or negative relationship between performance 
and budgeting may improve performance”.   
The third limit to performance budgeting is that we do not know how human behavior 
responds to financial incentives, particularly when the relevant dimensions of performance may 
be difficult to capture.  Some of the surveyed articles allude to the possible adaptation and 
unintended consequences of increased performance attention, especially when the budget is 
linked with performance.  For instance, Courty and Marschke (2003, p. 22) in their study of 
performance funding in federal job training program find that “states’ modifications to the 
scheme’s construction produced over time highly individualized performance funding schemes 
that likely varied in their effectiveness.”  This shows that behaviors may change in response to 
performance measurement. As behaviors may not change consistently across groups, or they may 
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change in any unexpected ways, there are concerns about incentive effectiveness and unintended 
consequences.  Additionally, the use of incentives is impaired by the inability to capture all of 
the relevant dimensions of programs that have outputs and outcomes that are difficult to measure.  
This is why Radin has claimed that “one-size-fits-all” performance measurement can lead to 
“perverse responses that do not lead to increased attention to performance” (2009, p.130).  How 
to address these incentive design issues is a fundamental challenge for performance budgeting 
and may explain why the use of financial (dis)incentives in budget laws is rare (Lu et al., 2009).  
Future studies may therefore explore further how budget allocation should (or should not) be 
used as an incentive for performance in light of these complexities.  
 
Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
Based on our review of 61 journals published in 2002-2011 that are related to 
performance budgeting or performance reform issues in the budgetary process, we analyze the 
trends of primary research questions, the major methodologies used, and the key factors that 
impacted the success of performance budgeting and the integration of performance information 
into the budgetary process.  Our findings show that significant progress has been made in the 
field, such as the diversification of research methods over time, and the development of a wide 
array of factors that seem to be the key to the implementation success of performance budgeting.  
However, we are also not satisfied with the current status of the field.  Particularly, we propose 
that future studies should utilize better research design or methodologies to control for different 
intervening factors over time to establish causality.  Also, many studies lack explicit theoretical 
frameworks to guide the qualitative and quantitative analyses.   As a result, the field still faces 
significant limitations in producing generalizable and actionable knowledge for practitioners.   
24 | P a g e  
 
Having identified 27 types of factors, an interesting question is whether we have enough 
factors to understand the dynamics of implementing performance budgeting.  Alternatively, do 
we already have too many? A reasonable basis of comparison could be the policy 
implementation literature, since in essence those studies are about implementing the policy of 
performance budgeting. In their seminal work on policy implementation, Mazmanian and 
Sabatier‘s (1989) model includes three broad categories of manipulable variables that help to 
explain implementation success:  
1. Tractability of the problem being addressed by the statute (i.e., availability of technology 
to solve the problem; diversity and size of target group; the extent of behavioral change 
sought);  
2. Ability of the statute to structure implementation (i.e., clear and consistent objectives, 
sound causal theory; financial resources; hierarchical integration with and among 
implementing institutions; decision-rules for implementers; selection of implementing 
officials, formal access to outsiders);  
3. Non-statutory variables that affect implementation (i.e., socioeconomic conditions; media 
attention; public support; support from sovereigns; commitment and leadership skill of 
implementing officials; and the disposition and resources of constituency groups).   
If we apply their model to understand the implementation of performance budgeting, we 
conclude that we have not studied enough factors. For instance, in relation to the legislature 
using performance information in budgeting, the literature has no clear response on the 
disposition and resources of their constituency groups, such as the role of citizens and policy 
lobbyists. In addition, new governance structures, such as multi-actor networks, demand new 
perspectives (factors) on performance budgeting.  Probably, a more important lesson from this 
25 | P a g e  
 
comparison is that the field of performance budgeting needs to organize the factors into a 
framework, just as the policy implementation field has done. As the field progresses, the need to 
organize our understanding in a systematic way will be as important as identifying new factors.   
One benefit of building frameworks is that it helps us uncover the inter-connectedness 
between implementation strategies, the larger institutional contexts, and the micro-behavioral 
factors.  “Success” is a normative concept and is tied directly to the original intention of a reform, 
but the goals and strategies of the reform are contextually bounded and driven by many political, 
economic, social, and organizational considerations of policymakers (Radin, 2006).   Also, 
leadership styles and strategies matter.  For example, agencies may try to set conservative goals 
to guarantee success, but they can be pushed by the executive leadership or policymakers to be 
more aggressive or risk-taking in outcome goal setting (Ho, 2007).  Demand from different 
constituencies and stakeholders may also lead to conflicting and sometimes unachievable goals 
and targets (Radin, 2000).  All these may lead to implementation difficulties, failures, and 
gaming behaviors (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006).   As a result, future studies need to 
focus more on the relationship between the intentionality, system design, implementation 
strategies, and leadership of performance budgeting (Ho and Im, 2014).  Also, the study of 
performance budgeting needs to go deeper into the decision-making process, going beyond the 
departmental analysis to the analysis of budget funds, programs, and even program activities.  By 
doing so, the contextual constraints on budgeting as well as the role of performance information 
in budgeting could be explained better.  In this endeavor, other fields, such as organizational 
theories, policy implementation theories, dialogue theory, and institutional theories, may be 
helpful.  
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In addition, we need to understand further the limitations of performance budgeting, 
because they can help us form ultimate and realistic expectations of the success of performance 
budgeting.  For example, as we asked before, should we increase or decrease funding in light of 
performance information, assuming enough political support and reasonable performance 
information quality?  The field poses this question as a dilemma, but it does not seem to 
recognize this as a researchable question.  Although the lack of empirical data may limit this 
research endeavor, and budgetary behaviors are hard to observe in the short term, we suggest that 
in-depth case studies may be a good starting point, while more departmental, program, or 
activity-level budgeting and performance data should be collected by researchers at the federal, 
state and local levels to tease out the extent and implications of a positive or negative 
relationship between performance and resource allocation. 
As researchers include more variables and more complicated frameworks, there is likely 
to be a further bifurcation in the methods that are used to study performance budgeting.  On the 
one hand, there is a need for more in-depth case and qualitative studies to analyze those variables 
and factors that are important but difficult to quantify.  On the other hand, there is also a need for 
more advanced quantitative analysis.  Movement toward more sophisticated models like 
structural equation modeling has the potential to capture difficult-to-measure qualitative 
variables and to model these variables in simultaneous ways that are much more like the real-
world policy environments encountered by budget makers and organizational leaders.  The 
research challenge is to bridge the gap between academic public administration and public 
administration in practice (Waldo, 1956).  For performance budgeting this requires a diversity 
and continued refinement of research methods.   
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Importantly, with the changing governance contexts faced by many countries, such as 
growing deficits and looming unfunded liabilities in many developed economies, the rising 
importance of multi-sectoral governance in service delivery, rising partisanship in the legislature, 
and growing distrust of the public sector, the focus of many performance budgeting studies 
seems to be too narrow (Van Dooren, De Caluwe & Lonti, 2012).  It only examines how the tool 
may impact the appropriation process without thinking about how the changing governance 
contexts may and should impact the design and implementation of the tool, and how the tool in 
return may help address the governance challenges faced by policymakers.  As the practice of 
performance budgeting begins to take root in more countries, including many non-western 
developing countries, we anticipate that the practice will become even more institutionally 
diffuse and diverse. Therefore, it is important to have more theoretical development that is 
contingency-based and institutionally sensitive so that researchers and practitioners can 
understand how culture, organizational norms, political system, and fiscal constraints may 
impact reform goals, strategies, and reform results (Ho and Im, 2014).   Diverse methods, 
theories, and contexts are likely necessary to further our understanding of how performance can 
inform budgeting. 
Given the above understanding, we conclude by suggesting the following lessons learned 
from the past studies and what future studies may explore further. 
  
1. Start the research with a clearer definition of the dependent variable of study and further 
explore the impact of performance budgeting in all phases of the budgeting process, in 
particular the fiscal and non-fiscal impact of performance information and analysis on 
budget preparation and budget execution; 
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2.  Refine the theoretical focus of performance budgeting, identify the key variables of 
importance rather than proposing more variables in the analysis, and examine  the inter-
relationships of variables in the framework, especially the relationship between reform goals, 
reform strategies, politics, administrative capacity, and leadership; 
3. Pay closer attention to the macro contextual factors such as the political institution, culture, 
and social norms and their impact on behaviors in performance budgeting; this 
consideration of contingency-based and institutionally sensitive approach to research is 
particularly important for comparative research, domestic and international;  
4. Examine the practice and impact of performance budgeting at the program or activity level, 
not just at the organizational or agency level;  
5. Study performance budgeting under new governance schemes,  such as governing by 
networks, private-public partnerships, and citizen engagement, since the traditional 
organizational focus of performance budgeting is not broad enough to embrace these 
governance challenges;  
6. Continue to embrace pluralism in methods. It is appropriate to use different types of methods 
contingent upon the availability of data and on context, and there is a need for collection of 
both qualitative and quantitative data.  
7. Further explore the limits and boundaries of performance budgeting, and the possible 
unintended negative consequences of performance budgeting on organizational behaviors 
and policy outcomes. 
 
In the current fiscal and economic environment, many countries are challenged to do 
more with less and are under greater global competitive pressure to deliver effective public 
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services.  As a result, public service performance, policy results, and budgeting have become 
inseparable. It is in this context that we believe performance budgeting will continue to play an 
important role in the practice of public budgeting and governance.  





1. The 14 journals were Public Budgeting and Finance, Journal of Public Policy Analysis 
and Management, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Governance, 
Public Administration Review, Public Administration, American Review of Public 
Administration, Public Performance and Management Review, International Review of 
Administrative Science, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting, and Financial 
Management, Review of Public Personnel Administration, Public Management Review, 
Administration and Society, and International Public Management Journal.  
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